The
introduction of the codecision procedure was expected to significantly alter
the distribution of power among the EU institutions. While the Council and
Commission were previously more powerful than the Parliament in legislative
decision-making, it was generally anticipated that codecision would weaken the
Commission and place the Parliament on equal footing with the Council. We
assess whether this has been the case in practice, using data on the
preferences of legislative actors in relation to a large number of proposals
negotiated between 1999 and 2009. We also test theoretical propositions derived
from Schelling regarding the effects of policy agreement within each chamber on
the relative bargaining success of the Council and EP. Our findings suggest that,
in comparison to the consultation procedure, codecision has strengthened the EP
and weakened the Commission. However, we find that the Council holds certain
bargaining advantages over the EP, and as a result the EP has not achieved
parity with the Council under codecision.