Bicameralism has a
significant effect on decision making only when the preferences of the two
chambers differ. This paper examines policy conflict between legislative bodies
in the European Union, which has a bicameral legislature consisting of the
European Parliament (EP) and Council of Ministers. Drawing on the comparative
literature on bicameralism, it is argued that the level of disagreement between
legislative chambers is influenced by the representative roles performed by
their members and their congruence along party and territorial
lines. Hypotheses are developed regarding the conditions under which the EP and
Council are most likely to disagree on matters of policy. The findings, based
on an analysis of legislative proposals decided between 1999 and 2004, suggest
that the similar geographic apportionment of votes in the two institutions
undermines their distinctiveness as legislative chambers. In particular, the EP
and Council are less likely to disagree when national interests (rather than
party interests) are to the fore. This also implies that the recent extension
of the EP’s powers under the Lisbon Treaty in areas such as agriculture and structural
funding will have a limited impact on policy outcomes, as these are areas where
competition along national lines tends to be particularly strong.