This paper provides a
reassessment of relations between the two legislative chambers in the EU, the
European Parliament and the Council of Ministers. Policy differences between these chambers are
of considerable interest, as under the codecision procedure (which is expected
to become the main legislative procedure in the near future) they are jointly
responsible for decisions. It is argued
here that competition between the chambers cannot be understood in terms of
their partisan composition. The question
of the appropriate level of government (EU or national) is always present in
legislative negotiations, and this generates persistent institutional
divisions. The political composition of each chamber only affects the extent of
conflict between them, not the nature of this conflict. This account of
inter-institutional politics is evaluated using data on the positions taken by
legislative actors on proposals negotiated between 1999 and 2005. In doing so,
evidence is brought to bear on a question that has received little empirical
attention to date.