Tax non-compliance results in the loss of government revenue every year. Non-compliance in relation to eCommerce is a particular risk due to the anonymity of sellers, the absence of traditional audit trails and the difficulty experienced by taxing authorities in accessing transactional data. This presents traders with an increased opportunity to evade. The 'slippery slope' framework suggests that compliance is maximised when there is a balance between deterrence intervention types (Kirchler et al, 2008). Both the trust and power of authorities have an optimum, with diminishing marginal returns. Taxpayers should be given the opportunity to comply and only in the absence of a satisfactory response, should enforcement take place. This implies that if online trading cannot be effectively policed, leading to an absence of deterrence, compliance levels will fall even among otherwise compliant traders. Growing evidence shows that third-party reporting affects compliance behaviour because it is a visible deterrent, and it facilitates the detection of undeclared trading activity (Lyer et al., 2010). Currently, mandatory information reporting is limited to traditional financial intermediaries such as banks. However, in many online transactions using more novel sales platforms and payment methods, these intermediaries are absent. Newer intermediaries such as eBay and PayPal have taken their place in the transaction. This review paper initially analyses how third-party reporting from these newer sales and payment intermediaries is being used internationally by taxing authorities to increase the visibility of income and improve compliance. Having established best practice, we then examine the issues involved in introducing such third-party reporting in relation to eCommerce in Ireland. The advantages, disadvantages and obstacles to implementing such a system are discussed. The paper highlights the importance of effective tax information exchange between nations in an increasingly global economy.